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Abstract
Science, industry, and society are being revolutionized by
radical new capabilities for information sharing, distributed
computation, and collaboration offered by the World Wide
Web. This revolution promises dramatic beneﬁts but also
poses serious risks due to the ﬂuid nature of digital infor-
mation. One important cross-cutting issue is managing and
recordingprovenance, or metadata about the origin, context,
or history of data. We posit that provenance will play a cen-
tral role in emerging advanced digital infrastructures. In this
paper, we outline the current state of provenance research
andpractice, identifyhard openresearch problemsinvolving
provenance semantics, formal modeling, and security, and
articulate a vision for the future of provenance.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.3.1 [Programming
Languages]: Formal Deﬁnitions and Theory
General Terms Languages, Security, Reliability
Keywords provenance,integrity, semantics
A future history of provenance
Transcribedkeynoteremarks from the 2019Federated
Provenance Conference, by [inaudible]
We won! Provenance is everywhere: it’s part of ev-
ery storage system and every application; it’s secure; it’s
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queryable; it’s indexed by standard search engines and can
be queried anywhere.
Provenance is pervasive, invisible, and handled automat-
ically by default. Ten years ago people regularly used data
without knowing where it was hosted or originated. Today
such a thing is unthinkable. Documents whose origins are
unknown are highly suspect and quickly attract the attention
of a small but enthusiastic anti-plagiarism community.
Both public and conﬁdentialprovenanceare incorporated
into the algorithms employed by major search engines, who
use the provenance of a page to weigh its reliability, and di-
rect searches toward more reputable results. Individuals are
able to query where their data is being used elsewhere on
the Web, and can derive economic beneﬁt and acclaim by
providing useful data. The Semantic Web only became truly
compelling once people had an incentive for contributing
high-quality metadata. Provenance tracking provided this
motivation by ensuring recognition for contributors. Some
curators even make a living managing Semantic Web meta-
data.
The old vertically-integrated media industries (particu-
larly music and print media) loved provenance—fora while.
They thought it would revive their dream of complete con-
trol over their intellectual property through digital rights
management. Indeed, provenance is now used to ensure that
authors and creators are recognized and rewarded for their
work, whether they are independent or afﬁliated with a ma-
jor media label or news agency. The key difference between
the success of provenance tracking and the failure of ear-
lier attempts at DRM is that provenance is based on volun-
tary participation in the online community, not on central-
ized control imposed by legislation or lawsuits. Creators are
free to decide whether to retain or expose provenance, and
recipients of such information are free to decide whether to
believe or trust it.
But how did we get here?
957By 2009, it was widely recognized that provenance was
important, but the effects of Moore’s Wall were only begin-
ning to be felt, and 20th-century assumptions about stor-
age and computational overhead still held sway. The cost
of storage was still relatively high—around $20 for a ter-
abyte instead of pennies. Likewise, typical personal com-
puters contained only a few cores rather than the hundreds
or thousands now common today, and reliable, usable con-
current programming languages had not yet become main-
stream. Now, of course, the extra storage and computational
overhead of instrumenting programs to record and maintain
detailed provenance metadata is effectively zero. Indeed,
provenance pays for itself in terms of decreased liability for
failures—most insurers today won’t even cover businesses
that use hardware or software that is not provenance aware.
A thornier issue was how to manage and search the
masses of detailed provenance information that began to
be generated. Early work viewed provenance as a simple
directed acyclic graph. While rich languages for querying
graph-likedatahadalreadybeenresearched,theyhadnotyet
been integrated into scalable, robust, and industrial-strength
systems. However, the development of DBMSs supporting
fast graph queries was only a ﬁrst step towards the rich
provenance query languages we have today. Provenance
queries essentially query the behavior of programs, and it
was a signiﬁcant challenge to formulate nontrivial prove-
nance queries manually over the raw, low-level representa-
tion as a DAG. Instead, the ﬁrst half of this decade saw the
development of advanced provenance query languages that
incorporated ideas from reﬂective and aspect-oriented pro-
gramming. These languages make it easy for programmers
to query provenance using the syntax they already use to
write programs. A nice side-beneﬁt of this was that major
programming languages and implementations ﬁnally took
database–programminglanguageintegrationseriously,solv-
ing the “impedance mismatch” problem once and for all.
Some cynics admitted that provenance might be impor-
tant for critical applications such as banking or medical
records, but doubted that it would carry over to general-
purpose applications: “as soon as you move an object from
one system to another,” they said, “you’re going to lose
its provenance—we can’t even do extended attributes in a
portable way!” But researchers and developers from a host
of differentareas bandedtogetherand formeda “provenance
community”. Much like in the early days of the Internet and
WorldWideWeb,theirgrass-rootseffortsledtotherapidde-
velopmentand implementationof de facto standards for rep-
resentingand transportingprovenancemetadata.These were
eventually codiﬁed by the W3C and other organizations.
The provenance tide began to turn when the ﬁnancial in-
dustry imploded in 2008. In the wake of this disaster, which
raised the stakes for regulatory oversight, the US Congress
passed the 2010 Oversight Act which mandated that every
major ﬁnancial transactionhave a veriﬁable record.This had
an energizingeffect onthe provenancecommunitysimilar to
that of the Department of Defense’s Orange Book on the se-
curity community in the 1970s. Other nations followed suit,
legislating stronger standards for transparency for both ﬁ-
nancial and social policy data.
Security and privacy also had to be completely rethought
with the adoption of pervasive provenance technology.
Nowadays, users can limit access to both sensitive data and
its provenance, at the cost that others may be less willing
to believe or trust their data. The tension between privacy
and provenance was graphically illustrated by the protests
in Iran following the contested election of June 2009. Sites
such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube played an essen-
tial role early on, making it possible for protesters to con-
nect with each other and journalists to report to the outside
world without governmentinterference, but there was also a
greatdealof unveriﬁable“noise”anddeliberatemisinforma-
tion.Moreover,this information(alongwith moretraditional
formsofsurveillance)was laterused effectivelyto singleout
prominent Facebook or Twitter users for persecution in the
brutal repression that followed the protests.
In the rest of this talk, I’ll ask you to think back to the
summer of 2009. It was a pivotal time for this ﬁeld. Many
of these ideas were in their infancy, and almost no one had
any idea how important provenance would become over the
next 10 years. In fact, many computer scientists had either
not heard of provenance, or thought it was either trivial or
outright impossible. Some early papers on provenance were
vague about either what they wanted to accomplish, or what
they were actually proposingas solutions. Many papers pro-
posed solutions to related problems, but did not provide
enough detail about either solution or problem to make a
real comparison possible. It was quite difﬁcult for newcom-
ers to the ﬁeld to understand what was really essential. Gen-
eral foundational deﬁnitions, clear problem statements, and
theories of provenanceonly started to coalesce by the end of
the last decade. These ideas played a central role in all of the
above developments, because a cohesive provenance com-
munity would have been impossible before everyone was
able to agree on basic deﬁnitions. Perhaps the most impor-
tant insight was...
[The rest of the recording is inaudible.]
1. Introduction
In an ideal world, software systems would be engineered
to the highest standards. Programs would be expressed in
intuitive high-level languages and their behavior would be
checked against clean formal speciﬁcations. Data would be
classiﬁed according to precise schemas and curated with ac-
curate metadata. But we do not live in that ideal world. Few
real-world systems meet these lofty standards. In practice,
programs are often built on top of legacy code and dirty data
containing errors, omissions and outright lies.
958Of course, these problems are not new—the difﬁculty of
building reliable software has long been known—but they
haverecentlybecomeevenmoreurgentas technologiessuch
as “the Semantic Web”, “Grid middleware”, “cloud comput-
ing”, “ubiquitouscomputing”,“eScience”, “cyberinfrastruc-
ture”, “e-Infrastructure”, etc. [21] start to take hold. These
emerging technologies build on the fabric provided by the
Internet and the World Wide Web to enable fundamentally
new kinds of interaction interact, collaboration and compu-
tation. For example, eScience and cyberinfrastructure sys-
tems are intended to give scientists easy access to high-
performance computing, help them create high-quality cu-
rated databases, and facilitate collaboration using social-
networking tools and virtual research environments.
But while these technologies offer dramatic advantages,
they also exacerbate the hazards posed by buggy programs
and dirty data. Digital information is easy to copy, change,
and misinterpret. Current software systems do not provide
the levels of repeatability, reliability, accountability and
integrity achieved by the paper-based technology—books,
academic journals and laboratory notebooks—that they are
predicted to replace [23].
Our thesis is that successfully realizing the visions(s)
of these revolutionary computing technologies will require
buildingprovenancetechnologyintoallcomputersystemsof
any importance.By provenance,we mean informationabout
the origin, context, or history of the data. By provenance
technology,wemeanthehardwareandsoftwarecomponents
that are needed to record and maintain robust provenance as
an end-to-end resource in a system. Provenance will help
recover the repeatability, integrity and authenticity proper-
ties of pre-digital information, and will also make it easier
to detect and preventfailures, analyze errors, and discourage
malfeasance by increasing transparency and accountability.
Without pervasive adoption of provenance technology,
critical computer systems and networks have serious vul-
nerabilities, which we call provenance failures. Today, such
failures are frequent, costly and embarrassing. Here are just
a few illustrative examples:
• In December 2006, a biochemist retracted ﬁve papers
after discovering bugs in a data analysis program that
had been used to generate several years of research re-
sults [26]. The use of sophisticated Grid, database and
other systems provides many new opportunities for simi-
lar errors to creep into the scientiﬁc record.
• In September2008, an undatedarticle concerningUnited
Airlines’ near bankruptcy [12] appeared on the list of
top stories on Google News. The story was no longer
relevant—it had originally been published six years
earlier—but investors panicked, and the share price of
the company fell by 75% before trading was halted.
• In February 2009, the US Congress passed into law a
$800 billion stimulus package. Changes were made by
Figure 1. The pen is mightier than the sword.
hand on paper copies of the bill only hours before it was
enacted, including changes to the amounts allocated to
speciﬁc programs. For example, a $3.4 billion allocation
to energy conservation programs was changed to $3.1
billion in the ﬁnal draft (see Figure 1).
• Prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion, the UK government pub-
lished Microsoft Word documents containingsupposedly
objective intelligence evaluations. However, the docu-
ments’revisionhistorydisclosedthat some ofthe authors
were political operatives [33].
• The current ﬁnancial crisis, which began in late summer
2008, is partly attributable to increased opacity of ﬁnan-
cial markets due to deregulation and large-scale comput-
erization over the last twenty years. Lewis and Cohan
write in the New York Times:
Ever since traders started disappearing from the
ﬂoor of the New York Stock Exchange in the last
decade of the 20th century, there has been less and
less transparency about the price and volume of
trades. [22]
They go on to call for the US government to mandate
that regulators provide impartial, transparent and trusted
information about transactions.
Generally speaking, a provenance failure is a negative
outcome caused by a failure to record, manage, interpret,
or control access to information and its provenance. These
failures are preventable, but currently prevention requires a
great deal of vigilance (and effort) from users and requires
cooperation across multiple systems and domains of con-
trol. Provenance failures will either continue to cause major
losses if critical systems are developed on top of advanced,
but unreliable infrastructure, or will, ipso facto, ensure that
such infrastructure is not used for anything important.
Provenance failures overlap with other well-known kinds
of failures in computer systems, such as hardware failures,
software bugs that lead to incorrect (or misleading) results,
and security vulnerabilities that allow misuse (or prevent
legitimate use) of computer systems. However, provenance
failures also differ from each of these in important ways. In
particular, provenance failures involve users’ expectations
or (mis)interpretations of data in a system relative to real-
world artifacts or situations. Provenance failures thus do not
appear to map naturally to the existing goals of correctness
or efﬁciency. Moreover, although provenance is similar to
security in that it is a hard-to-deﬁne, end-to-end property of
a system, existing securitymodels do not yet seem to help us
959to understand provenance either. Therefore, we believe that
accurately modeling and effectively combating provenance
failures requires new ideas.
Unfortunately, the challenge of provenance is often un-
derappreciated. Provenance seems trivial, in theory: as a
thought experiment, one can just imagine recording every-
thing that might be useful later on. Of course, this is not fea-
siblein practice;however,it is alsoproblematicin theory,for
it begs the question of how to deﬁne “everything”—whendo
we stop? Likewise, given an idealized, but impractical deﬁ-
nition of “everything”, how can we compare practical tech-
niques that fall short of this ideal? These questions seldom
receive the attention they deserve. Instead systems (or users)
that record provenance typically do so in an ad hoc way
based on perceived needs or as a reaction to known prob-
lems. In the absence of agreement about even basic deﬁni-
tions, goals, and success criteria for provenance techniques,
it is hard to see how we can do better.
High-performance computing, formal veriﬁcation, and
security are widely appreciatedto be challenging.Theyeach
have a received a great deal of attention within cohesive re-
search communities, have well-developed theoretical foun-
dations, and have made signiﬁcant practical impact. The
study of provenancecurrently enjoys none of these features,
although it is increasingly recognized as a hard problem:
in the US it has been included on the InfoSec Council’s
Hard Problems List [3], and in the UK it has been identi-
ﬁed as a Grand Challenge by the British Computing Soci-
ety [2]. Nevertheless, there is little broad understanding of
what provenanceis, what problemsit solves, or what the key
open problems or challenges are.
This paper is a call to arms for provenance-related re-
search, outlining directions that we believe are understudied
and drawing attention to some of the hard problems involv-
ingprovenance,inthehopetheaccomplishmentsanticipated
in our opening remarks may become reality. This paper is
not an attempt at a complete or fair survey of the ﬁeld; we
refer interested readers to other recent surveys [7,29] and
resources [1].
We begin in Section 2 by giving a high-level overview
of provenance and its potential for digital information. In
Section 3 we discuss some of the problems with the current
treatment of provenance, while in Section 4 we outline our
views of the key challenges and open problems that must be
addressed in order to developrobust provenancetechnology.
We conclude in Section 5.
2. What is provenance and what is it for?
What is provenance? That depends on the context in which
the question is posed, and on the goals provenance is ex-
pected to achieve. Many differentuser communitiesare call-
ingforsomemetadatacalled“provenance”,buteachofthese
communities actually has different underlying needs and
applications in mind [1]. Moreover, different communities
think of their objects and data at different semantic levels.
So just like any programming or data management problem,
we should ask what provenance is, what problems it solves,
and how we shall recognize success.
The concept of “provenance” originates from the art and
archiving worlds, where it refers to information about the
creation, chain of custody, modiﬁcations or inﬂuences per-
taining to an artifact.
In the art world, such documentation is important for be-
ing able to judgeauthenticity,that is, whethera work is what
its owners/sellers claim it is (rather than a forgery). Thus, it
is important that the record be as detailed as possible, and
that it be possible to check the record against other, indepen-
dent records as well as against the artifact itself.
In archiving, provenance is related to integrity, such as
the principle that archivists should respect the order or orga-
nizationofacollectionofdocumentsthatarebeingarchived:
thisprincipleis calledrespectdesfonds.Thisisincontrastto
archivingpractices popular in earlier periods (e.g., 19th cen-
tury) when archivists often devised their own scheme for re-
organizing collections. Doing so discards information about
the relationships among objects that might not be apparent
to the archivist and might be difﬁcult for others to recover
after reorganization.
A more concrete answer to the question “what is prove-
nance for digital artifacts” is to look at features or appli-
cations of current computer systems that appear related to
history tracking, logging, integrity, authenticity, or error re-
covery. Most computer systems, and many users, currently
track such information to aid in error correction, debugging,
auditing, or just as simple memory aids:
• Operating systems log important system events, to aid
system administration and intrusion detection.
• File systems record basic metadata such as ﬁle creation,
modiﬁcation, ownership and permissions.
• Version control systems record metadata about when
changes have been made and by whom.
• Compilersuse sourcelinenumbertaggingtoaid in point-
ing to the sources of compile-time or run-time errors.
• Scientiﬁc database curators maintain detailed high-level
recordsofwhohas inserted,modiﬁedordeleteddata,and
(sometimes) where it has been copied from.
• Web browsers retain history information about which
sites have been visited and when.
• Users of Twitter, Friendfeed and other social network-
ing systems employ informal conventionsconcerningac-
knowledging sources of quoted data or links, e.g. the ab-
breviations “RT” (ReTweet) or “HT” (Hat Tip).
Although each of the above represents an example of prove-
nance, we do not believe any of the above mechanisms pro-
vides a self-contained deﬁnition of provenance, even within
its context. In each case, we can imagine taking the exist-
960ing system and modifying it to record more information that
could be considered provenance, though again this would
quicklybecomeimpractical.Thus,each of the abovemecha-
nisms represents a practical summary of the true provenance
of the system, a concept which we posit exists in each case
but won’t try to deﬁne.
Now what is provenance for? We have given two typical
motivations above, namely for assessing authenticity and
integrity. The above examples also suggest distinguishing
two complementary motivations for recording provenance:
failure recovery and success validation.
Any computer system can fail in a number of ways: there
canbeahardwarefault,softwarebug,malicioususer,orsim-
ple human error. When a failure occurs, we need to know
what happened,how the failure occurred,who was involved,
who was to blame, and how safeguard against similar fail-
ures in the future. Conversely, if a system is being used to
make decisions uponwhich signiﬁcant resources or lives de-
pend, then it is important for the process leading to a partic-
ular decision to be transparent, comprehensible, and persis-
tent. Such decisions need to be justiﬁed by explicitly show-
ing how the results were derived, what assumptions or ap-
proximations were used, who was involved, who deserves
credit, and how to reproduce the results in different circum-
stances.
Scientists are required to imagine (and defend against)
all the possible ways their experiments might fail or might
mislead us into drawing ﬂawed conclusions. Accordingly,
laboratory scientists have developed careful record-keeping
practices that make it easier for a scientist to satisfy herself
(and to convince others) that her work is valid, repeatable,
and accurate. These records anticipate scientists’ need for
both success validation and failure recovery in the course of
responsible conduct of research [24].
Failure recovery and success validation are dual. In fail-
ure recovery, we are faced with a speciﬁc bad outcome that
we want to understand and avoid repeating. In success val-
idation, we are faced with some (claimed) good results that
we want to validate and replicate or generalize. Both fail-
ure recovery and success validation involve understanding
causal chains of events and counterfactual possibilities.
More generally, provenance addresses problems of the
following form: we have a system description together with
some speciﬁc inputs and outputs, and we wish to understand
(or explain) the process by which the system transformed
the inputs to the outputs. Such explanations can have many
forms,dependingon whataspects of the system behaviorare
considered critical. Moreover,different kinds of explanation
address different informal motivations such as authenticity,
integrity, transparency, and accountability. Of course, so far
these are all relatively vagueconceptsthat can be interpreted
in a numberof differentways, anddevelopingmoreconcrete
deﬁnitions of these concepts is a major part of the challenge.
3. Problems with current reality
Provenance is information, and as such, we must consider
how to deﬁne, manage, and secure it. There are both sub-
jective and objective aspects of provenance that must be
carefully untangled. Moreover, we also need to consider
semantic issues such as when provenance correctly repre-
sents a system or explains a situation. As well, there is the
meta-issueof whetherprovenanceinformationneeds tohave
provenanceof its own (and if so, where does this stop?) Sat-
isfying answers to these questions have not yet been found;
instead, we perceivea numberof basic problemswith prove-
nance in today’s systems.
Provenance is incomplete. Often this is for efﬁciency rea-
sons basedon datedassumptionsaboutthe cost of secondary
storage,whichis increasinglycheapcomparedtootherhard-
ware. However, there is a more fundamental problem: dif-
ferent applications have different provenanceneeds, and it is
notclearwhetherthereis aplausible“onesizeﬁts all”prove-
nance solution that can be hard-wired into general-purpose
systems. It may be better to instead develop interfaces for
customizing the collection of provenance information.
Provenanceisunreliable. Computersystemsalreadyman-
ageprovenanceinnumerousways.Mostoftheseapproaches
are unreliable in the sense that the guarantees provided are
minimal or unclear,and system behavioris unspeciﬁed or ad
hoc. This places severe limitations on the ability of users to
trust distributed data and computations on the Web. If users
have mistaken intuitions about the meaning of provenance,
they will likely make poor decisions and incorrectly assign
blame (or praise). Even worse, if attackers can manipulate
provenanceinformation,then users have to considerthe pos-
sibility of plagiarism, framing and identity fraud. If these
risks are well-known,then users will likely simply disregard
provenance,leading to wasted collection effort. Having low-
quality or easily forged provenance may actually be worse
than having no provenance at all!
Provenance is insecure. As discussed by Braun et al. [8],
preventing unauthorized access to data is insufﬁcient to en-
sure that sensitive provenance remains conﬁdential. Con-
versely, permitting access to (non-conﬁdential) provenance
may disclose conﬁdential data. More generally, adding
provenance to systems introduces new privacy and secu-
rity risks even as it increases transparency and accountabil-
ity, as illustrated for example by the the Iraq intelligence
report metadata information leaks in Microsoft Word and
other applications. Provenance tracking (like other forms
of surveillance) may have a chilling effect on freedom of
expression; to avoid this problem, it may be important to
preserve “provenance-freezones”.
Provenanceis heterogeneous. As discussed above,prove-
nance information is currently managed in many different
ways for many different purposes in various systems. These
961facilities have often grown organically in response to per-
ceived needs, rather than as part of an overall design philos-
ophy.Inaddition,the informationis recordedat manydiffer-
ent levels of granularity—whole ﬁles vs. individual lines, or
whole databases vs. database records. When systems man-
age provenance in idiosyncratic ways, then it is a major
chore to integrate these different kinds of provenance af-
ter the fact. Some progress towards a standard format for
provenance has been made in the Open Provenance Model
effort [25]. This work standardizes a syntax and controlled
vocabulary for provenance, but there is still plenty of scope
for incompatibility and misinterpretation.
The problem is similar to that of data integration, aris-
ing where differentdatabases have been developedto handle
similar data but differ in terms of data format, layout, and
granularity. Reconciling these changes is highly labor inten-
sive and has motivated (at least!) 20 years of research with
no end in sight [34]. Perhaps existing techniques for data in-
tegrationcanbeadaptedtohelpwith provenanceintegration.
Conversely, provenance information may help attain higher
quality in data integration.
Provenance is non-portable. How do we deal with prove-
nance for mobile data that moves among systems? This
is a commonplace scenario: consider, for example, curated
databases where curators manually browse journal articles,
online analysis tools and other databases and copy and paste
data into their databases, or any kind of collaboration in-
volving emailing copies of a document back and forth. Re-
cently developed distributed version-control systems, such
as Git, Darcs, and Mercurial, may offer some ideas about
how to manage provenance for mobile, distributed objects
that could be generalized to other settings. However, truly
solving this problem may require architectural changes at
the hardware, network, operating system, or Web levels (or
all of the above).
Little provenance research is precise, formal or repeatable.
As argued above, we believe provenance failures are based
in part on subjective concerns such as how users interpret
metadata. However, we do not believe that this means that
we should abandon existing principles for the design, speci-
ﬁcation, and veriﬁcation of computer systems. It can be haz-
ardous to implement the ﬁrst thing that comes to mind with-
out clear understanding of the design space—people might
(mis)place faith in a system, with dangerous consequences.
Moreover,evenif it is ultimately a subjectivematter to judge
whether a provenance system design is adequate for a given
purpose, we should have clear speciﬁcations that both users
and implementors can rely on.
We believe that both provenance solutions and the prob-
lems they are meant to solve need to be formulated clearly
in a rigorous framework. Unfortunately, a lot of the work
done so far on provenance has fallen short in this respect.
Often, the actual or desired behavior of a system (or both)
are described only in vague terms. For example, a form of
provenance is often motivated as
• being “complete”, or “(more) accurate (than another)”,
• as capturing information about “(causal) dependences”,
“inﬂuences”, “sources”, “relevance”,
• or as being an “explanation”, “justiﬁcation”, or “evi-
dence”.
These are loaded terms. They are frequently used as moti-
vation but without any further deﬁnition of their meaning in
terms of the system that the provenance information is sup-
posed to describe. This is unacceptable because a reader (or
user or developer) may interpret one of these terms differ-
ently from the way intended by the author, leading to con-
fusion and likely to provenance failures. Moreover, the lack
of precise deﬁnitions and clear descriptions hinders compar-
isons in terms of effectiveness, expressiveness or efﬁciency;
eveniftwosystemshavesimilarmotivation,theirimplemen-
tations may be so different as to render comparisons mean-
ingless.
Thus, besides our concern with the clarity of descriptions
of proposedtechniquesforprovenance,we believethat there
are serious gaps in our understanding of the intended goals
of such techniques. In terms familiar from computer secu-
rity,todaywe see manyproposalsformechanismsforprove-
nance, but few clear policies describing what such mech-
anisms are meant to achieve. Computer security beneﬁted
greatly by adopting a formal approach [5], and we believe
that more formalism will also be required for provenance
technology to succeed.
4. Towards solutions
As with manyemergingtechnologies,we expectprovenance
technology to develop in roughly three stages: research,
early adoption, and maturity. We expect provenance to face
similar challenges as other network effect technologies that
become compelling only when a critical mass is reached.
However, there are aspects of provenance that seem espe-
cially challenging and that we believe don’t receive the at-
tention they deserve.
Semantics Many forms of provenance could be captured
foraparticularsystem.Atabareminimum,wewanttoknow
where a particular piece of data comes from [9,10]. In an e-
science setting, however, we additionally want to know why
an in-silico analysis gave a particular output [10,15], how it
was computed [18], or what dependencies the output has on
different inputs [13]. Some techniques (such as PASS [27]
and PASOA [25]) attempt to record everything that a given
system component can record, building a detailed trace or
“causal graph”.
While the above forms of provenance have already been
introduced and studied in the literature for speciﬁc settings
and languages—e.g., relational databases, workﬂows, or
962ﬁle systems—there is need for generally applicable, for-
mal foundations for provenance. Moreover, since we can
only expect provenance to become ubiquitously available if
the effort of adding provenance support to systems is rel-
atively low, we need an efﬁcient methodology that allows
this general theory to be easily applied to new settings and
languages. One issue of current interest is how to integrate
provenance models that have been developed separately for
databases and workﬂow systems; more generally, we think
it is essential to develop a clearer formal understanding of
modularity and abstraction for provenance.
Traces,incremental,andbidirectionalcomputation Many
forms of provenance are motivated by a desire to cache in-
termediate results and support efﬁcient recomputation when
the input changes. Incremental recomputation is a classi-
cal problem encountered in many different guises through-
out computer science (particularly view maintenance in
databases [19]). Many approaches employ “traces”, or in-
termediate data structures that elucidate how the output
was computed from the input [4]. Thus, when the input is
changed, we can propagate the effects forward efﬁciently
by replaying just a part of the trace. Such trace informa-
tion ought to be computable from a sufﬁciently rich form
of provenance; alternatively, perhaps we should view such
traces as a form of provenance in their own right. However,
while the “trace everything” approach seems to capture the
most provenance-related information, it is currently unclear
what language should be used to pose provenance queries
on traces. Since such queries essentially inspect program
behavior, languages for meta-programming [30] and meta-
querying [32] seem like a good starting point.
Provenance has also been linked to the classical view up-
date problem in databases [11], and generalizations such as
bidirectional computation [17]. In recent work on bidirec-
tional transformations,or “lenses”, where-provenanceinfor-
mation has been found useful for dealing with ordered data
collections [6]. In light of these observations, we think that
understanding the relationships between provenance, incre-
mental/adaptivecomputation,and bidirectionalcomputation
is a key open problem. For example, can pervasive prove-
nance technology also enable new solutions to these old
problems?Conversely,can these existingtechniquesbe used
to better understand the foundations of provenance?
Dependence, information ﬂow, and security Information-
ﬂowsecurityis basedonformalismssuchas dependenceand
noninterferencethatalsounderlieprogramslicingandanaly-
sis. Previous work on dependency provenance adapted these
ideas tomotivateaformofprovenancethatprovidesa strong
guarantee that it captures all dependence information [13].
It is an open question how to deﬁne security for prove-
nance. Some previous work (starting with [8,31]) has con-
sidered access control and other security issues for prove-
nance information, but does not formalize security policies
orprovecorrectnessofimplementations.Chong[14]setsout
initial attempts at deﬁnitions for security properties for sys-
tems in which both data and provenance may be conﬁden-
tial; this work is formulated in terms of detailed operational
traces, but seems adaptable to other forms of provenance.
However,there are many issues that need further study, such
as privacy and audit in the presence of provenance.
Causality,trust, knowledge,andbelief Theseconceptsare
often invoked as motivations for provenance, but they are
nontrivial. For example, the nature of causality has been de-
bated by philosophers for centuries, famously Hume, and
continuing to this day. It is far from obvious how to make
sense of informal claims that a given provenancerecord cor-
rectly captures a causal relationship, increases trust, or jus-
tiﬁes a knowledge or belief, and most research papers don’t
even try. However, recent work on mathematical models of
causality [20], trust [28], and knowledge [16] may provide a
good starting point for answering these questions.
5. Conclusions
The Web and other technologies are revolutionizingthe way
we create, share and use information; this revolution offers
great beneﬁts but also exposes us to serious new risks. We
believethat provenancewill playanessential rolein this rev-
olution, providing data integrity, trustworthiness, authentic-
ity,andavailability,whileofferingpotentialbeneﬁtstoinfor-
mation retrieval, collaboration, and scientiﬁc computation.
However,most work on provenanceso far has focusedon
developingsystems that address immediate perceivedneeds,
rather than understanding foundational questions such as
“what is provenance?”, “how do we know when we have
enough provenance for a given application?”, or “how can
we assess or compare approaches to provenance?” We be-
lievethat satisfactory answersto these kinds ofquestionsde-
mand serious consideration of underlying issues such as the
semantics of provenance and the nature of trust and causal-
ity in computer systems. Only once these foundations are
better understood—that is, only once the problems we want
provenance to solve are clearly deﬁned—can we make real
progress on solving them and developing a robust prove-
nance layer for the future Web infrastructure.
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